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Authority for said appeal is found within the confine of Rule 26 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah State Constitution Article 
1, Section 12; Utah Code Annotated Section 77-1 6(g); and Section 78-2-
2 (i) Utah Code Annotated. The matter was appeal originally to the 
Utah Supreme Court but later assigned to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The defendant's home was searched pursuant to a search warrant. 
Appellant argues that the affidavit in support the issuance of the warrant 
was constitutionally deficient. 
The defendant argues that the affidavit is lacking in the following 
respects: 
(1) The affidavit failed give probable cause to issue the search 
warrant. The warrant was based on information from 
unnamed informants. There was no attempt to verify their 
reliability nor date any of the informant's conclusions. There 
was no effort to either detailed substantiation or any 
independent corroboration. 
(2) The affidavit failed to give sufficient cause to obtain 
permission to enter without notice and authority (no-knock). 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Defendant entered a "Sery Plea" to the charge of illegal possession 
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony. The defendant 
preserved her right to appeal the trial court's denial of two motions to 
suppress the evidence challenging the constitutionally of the search 
warrant. 
The Appellate Court should "determine whether the issuing 
magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that there were enough 
facts within the affidavit to find that probable cause existed." In so doing, 
the Court should consider the affidavit "in its entirety," State v. Anderson, 
701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985); State v. Collard, 810 P.2d at 886. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A magistrate issued a search warrant on August 14, 2002. It 
authorized entrance into the appellant's home at 480 North 100 West, 
Mt. Pleasant, Utah. The warrant authorized a search without notice of 
authority. 
The affidavit's basis for the issuance of the warrant is as follows: 
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(3) Since June 19, 2002, the officer has received information from 
one citizen informant that a lot of short term traffic had arrived 
and departed the residence of 480 North 100 West. 
(4) The citizen informant gave information about vehicle licenses 
and personal knowledge of individuals going to the residence. 
a. No date is given for these observations. The only date suggested is 
June 19 wherein the affiant reports that he started receiving 
reports. He applied for the warrant 52 days later on August 10. 
b. No information is give as to how such an informant gathered the 
information and no information is given as to why this informant 
should be deemed reliable. 
(5) Based on this first informant's information, criminal histories 
were ran on those persons visiting the Poulson home. Those seven 
(7) persons were identified as: 
i. Gary Sorenson was arrested for four offenses but convicted of 
only of one-- Distribution and Possession of Methamphetamine. 
He was arrested for Carrying a Concealed Weapon and 
Domestic Violence. 
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ii. John Ramey. He was arrested for Aggravated Burglary, 
Narcotic Equipment, Amphetamine Possession, but convicted 
only of assault, 
iii. Kenneth Hinton was convicted of two drug related offenses 
and arrested for two more, 
iv. David Timms was convicted of Possession of a Controlled 
Substance and Escape. He was arrested for Distribution and 
Paraphernalia, 
v. Jessica Shelly was convicted of Possession and Paraphernalia. 
She was arrested for Possession with Intent, paraphernalia and 
Distribution, 
vi. Allen Stevens was convicted of Possession of Marijuana and 
arrested for Domestic Assault, 
vii. Terry Hanks has been convicted of Possession of marijuana. 
Interestingly, no dates are given for any conviction or arrest. 
The affiant reports that, in addition to the names noted above, 14 
others separate car have arrived at the residence at different times and 
dates. Sometimes, some of these have been there more than once. 
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a. Again no dates are given. 
b. The source of the information is not disclosed. 
c. The affidavit does not set out why this information is reliable. 
d. The affidavit is absence why 14 cars appearing at a residence over 
an undisclosed time is significant. If we used the June 19th as a 
beginning date, one car would appear every 3-4 days. 
(6) The affiant reports that another unnamed informant met with two 
other officers and reported that that Paula Poulson has been and is 
selling methamphetamine. 
a. There is no corroboration of this information. However, the affiant 
advises that he believes the information is reliable because it 
coincides with the information from another second unnamed 
informant talking who apparently reported to other officers-
double hearsay. 
b. There is no assertion nor basis of the reliability assigned to this 
information or to the other unnamed informant. 
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c. There are no dates given and no factual basis given for the 
informant's conclusion. As with most of the affidavit, we are 
offered only conclusions without substantiation of facts. 
(7) This second citizen informant disclosed that he has seen Paula 
Poulson picking up methamphetamine from Gary Sorenson's home. 
The informant reports having personal knowledge that Paula Poulson 
was selling methamphetamine for Gary Sorenson. 
a. No dates are given. 
b. No information is given as to the underlying basis for this 
conclusion. 
c. The officer does not know this informant but acknowledges that 
this informant is not the same as the initial informant. This 
informant spoke with other officers not himself. 
(8) The affaint reports that detectives did execute a search warrant on 
August 8, 2002 at Gary Sorenson's house and found both drugs and 
paraphernalia. It is to be noted that Sorenson was not at home. 
(9) However, Sorenson had been seen at Poulson's residence on August 
9th and 10th. 
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a. However, the source of this information is not given; and 
b. No reliability is asserted for its trustworthiness. 
c. It is to be noted that this is substantially to only relevant date 
given. 
No effort was made to set out a relevant time frame excepting that 
Sorenson was seen at the Poulson home on August 9 and 10th, 2002. 
The only of reference to any date is that affiant had receiving a report 
from a citizen informant on June 19, 2002. 
Respecting the three informants: 
1. All are unnamed. 
2. No basis is offered to determine their reliability. There 
is not even an assertion of reliability except where one 
unconfirmed report is referred to as supporting 
another unconfirmed report. 
3. There is no detailed information offered to determine 
how the informants drew their conclusions. 
4. There is no effort to corroborate any of the data. 
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No-Knock. The grounds for the issuance of a 'no knock' warrant 
is reportedly the persons going to the residence have a history of 
violence ranging from assault to weapons and concealed weapons 
violations. However, the data given of all the persons to the home 
reports only one conviction for any conduct involving violence {John 
Ramey— Assault.) 
No data is given as to when John Ramey was present. We do 
not know how often John Ramey has been at the home. We do not 
know if his presence at the home was within days, months or years. We 
do not know if he was a guest; person making some repairs to the 
home; delivery commercial products or other legal activity. 
This request is also based on an undated report from an 
unnamed informant without any basis to assign any reliability to it. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The affidavit here is based on three unnamed informants. The 
informants offer conclusion without any detailed factualize information. No 
relevant time periods are assigned to any of the informant's reports. 
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Search warrants should not be issued except upon a finding of 
reliability. Under Utah case law, the information must be analyzed focusing 
on the following: 
2. The type of tip or informant involved 
3. Did the informant give enough detail about the observed 
criminal activity to support the issuance of a search warrant. 
4. Did the police officer's personal observations the informants tip. 
Here, the affidavit is deficient for the following reasons: 
1. The information is from an unnamed informants. 
5. There was no detailed factual basis offered only conclusions. 
6. There was no effort to corroborate the information provided; and 
7. No relevant time periods were assigned to any critical date. 
POINT I - THE SEARCH WAELRANT WAS ISSUED 
WITHOUT ANY SHOWING OF PROBABLE CAUSE THAT 
THE ITEMS SOUGHT WERE IN THE DEFENDANT'S 
RESIDENCE. 
a. Determining Probable Cause. 
No warrant shall issue but upon a finding of probable cause. 
Fourth Amendment, U.S. Constitution; Art. I Section 14 Utah State 
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Constitution. State v. Purser. 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992); State 
v. Babbell. 770 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah 1989). 
Citizens are protected from unwarranted intrusions, especially 
into their homes. The Constitution, both State and Federal, mandate 
that unless the police can show a magistrate probable cause to enter a 
home, they shall not enter. 
a. The Police must convince the Magistrate that there is 
probable cause to believe that items sought are where they 
seek to search. General searches are unconstitutional. 
Believing a suspect is a criminal is not by itself adequate to 
search his/her home. There must exist probable cause to believe that the 
things sought as objects of the warrant are located in the place to be 
searched. State v. Potter. 860 P.2d 952 (Utah Ct App. 1993); U.S. v. 
Ramos. 923 F.21d 1346 (9th Cir. 1991); State v. Sholes. 818 P.2d 343 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1991). 
In determining whether probable cause exists, the magistrate 
must "make a practical, common-sense decision whether . . . there is a 
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a 
14 
particular place." Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 
2317,2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). State v. Potter. 860 P.2d 952 (Utah 
CtApp. 1993). 
In State v. Potter. 860 P.2d 952 (Utah Ct App. 1993) this Court 
found probable cause lacking that the property sought is present where 
the police seek to search. See also U.C.A. 77-23-203. 
Here, the best evidence suggesting that drugs are at the Poulson 
home is tangential, at best. It is the following: 
(1) Seven persons with some criminal history were at the 
home arguable over a fifty-two (52) day period. The fifty-two 
day period is surmised from the date of the warrant's 
application and the date inferred when an informant started 
noting persons being present. 
The Potter Court held that the presence of a convicted 
drug user does not indicated that drugs would be found in the 
home. It may be proof of prior involvement but not a 
predictor of future use. 
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(2) Fourteen (14) cars appearing at arguably a rate of one 
over 3-4 days. A recluse may have more cars showing up at 
his place than one every 3-4 days. (52 days /14 cars). 
(3) An unnamed informant suggested that Poulson was picking 
up methamphetmine from Sorensen and selling it for 
Sorenson. No specification is given that she is selling from the 
home. The better indicator would be that drugs may be at 
Sorenson's home but not Poulson's. No dates are given other 
than this generalized conclusion. 
There must be a nexus drawn between the place to be searched 
and the items sought. Here, none existed. 
Further, this information is not reliable since it relies on an 
unnamed criminal informant. 
c. Reliability of Unnamed Informants 
Because probable cause is predicated on information from an 
informant, we first examined the informant's tip together with police 
observations corroborating the report. State v. Valenzuela, 37 P.3d 260 
(Utah Ct. App. 2001). See also Gates v. Illinois, 462 U.S.213, 238, 103 S. 
16 
Ct 2317, 2332 (1983). Here the police seek to use three (3) separate 
informants. All are unnamed. 
The determination of reliability is premised on the analysis set forth 
in Kavsville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 331 (Ut. Ct. App. 1997). See also 
State v. Valenzuela, 37 P.3d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). 
This same analysis was thereafter applied for a probable cause 
determination for search warrants. See State v. Saddler,2003 UT App 82, 
67 P.3d 1025 cert, granted, 76 P.3d 691 (Utah 2003) and State v. Dabble, 81 
P.3d 783 (2003 Utah Ct. App.). However, this analysis is also set out in 
Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317,2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 
527(1983). 
In Mulcahy, an informant called police dispatch to report a 
suspected drunk driver. The report included the informant's name and 
address, a description of the car involved, the direction of travel and the 
street name where the suspect was last seen as well as the suspect's name 
and phone number. This information was passed along to dispatch and then 
to a patrol officer. Based on this information, the officer stopped Mulcahy. 
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This Court found that the tip was sufficiently reliable to support a 
reasonable articulable suspicion based on the details set out by the tip. The 
Court, however, pronounced three factors to consider the reliability and 
sufficiency of the informant's tip. 
Our first focus is upon "the type of tip or informant involved," 
granting identified informants substantially more credibility than 
anonymous informants. Next, we examine "whether the informant 
gave enough detail about the observed criminal activity to 
support a [seizure]," and concluded that "[a] tip is more reliable if it 
is apparent that the informant observed the details personally, instead 
of relaying information from a third party." Finally, we examine 
"whether the police officers personal observations confirm the 
dispatcher's report of the informant's tip," noting that an officer 
can corroborate the information ""either by observing the illegal 
activity[,] or by finding the person, [and the other material facts] 
substantially as described by the informant.1" 
In Valenzuela, the arrest was based on a tip from an unnamed bank 
teller. The Court found reasonable cause lacking. The informant's name 
was not known, although it is clear the information came from a bank teller. 
The informant's basis of knowledge of suspected criminal activity was not 
known and there was no corroboration by the officer. Without more, the 
Court found the tip deficient to justify an immediate stop and search of the 
accused. The Valenzuela Court applied the Mulachy analysis. 
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In State v. Sadler, the Court applied the same analysis to search 
warrants. There the Court found the affidavit deficient. 
In Sadler, the affidavit advised, "CI has not been promised nor paid 
for any of the information provided". The affiant claimed "CI. . . provided 
the information out of a sense of guilt and desire to stop the sales and usage 
of controlled substances into the community". The CI also knew the 
suspect, Saddler, for over one year. However, the informant remained 
unnamed. 
Appellant here, applying the same analysis, finds all the informants 
here are unnamed. In fact, both Sadler and Valenzuela both have 
considerably more information referencing the identity of the informants 
than here. 
INFORMANTS 
The first informant, reportedly a citizen informant, gives 
nonspecific reports of certain people seen at Poulson's home. The affiant 
states that he starting receiving the reports on June 19, 2002 (nearly two 
months prior to the application for the search warrant). The informant tells 
that seven (7) people have been seen at the home. If you used June 19 as 
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the commencement date, over the next 52 days, one identified person 
showed up about every seven days. 
The affiant included this as significant due to the criminal histories 
of the seven (7) persons reported. However, as noted, in State v. Potter, the 
presence of people with a drug history, cannot be used to concluded that 
drugs are at the home. See also State v. Sykes, 840 P.2d 825 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992), where this Court found that a person leaving a suspected drug 
house does not equate to reasonable cause to stop him. 
The second informant, a criminal informant, reportedly gives 
information to two other officers. The informant's report is that Poulson is 
selling methamphetamine for Sorenson. This informant is unnamed and 
there is no attempt to distinguish this report from a rumor. No dates are 
given. 
The third informant reports that he witnessed Poulson picking up 
methamphetamine from Sorenson's home. Again, the informant is unnamed 
and there is no assertion of reliability and again no date is given. 
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The common thread shared by all is that they are anonymity. We 
know nothing about them except the first and third are identified as citizen 
informants and the second as a criminal informant. 
Under the guidance of both Sadler and Valenzuela, unnamed 
informants are not granted any indicia of reliability. This is also the holding 
of Illinois v.Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317. See also State v. 
Deluna, 2001 Ut App 401, 40 P.3d 1136. 
As noted in Davis v. State, 447 S.E.2d 68, 70 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) 
an anonymous tipsters should not automatically be deemed "concerned 
citizens" without some showing of a factual basis to conclude that he/she is 
in fact credible. 
The informant was merely an anonymous tipster, not entitled 
to preferred status regarding the credibility of his information. 
The complete lack of information about the informant 
relegated the information he supplied to the status of rumor 
Here, we know nothing of the informants excepting the affiant's 
assertion that the first and third are citizen informants. He gives us nothing 
to support this conclusion. 
UNNAMED INFORMANT'S RELIABILITY 
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In Utah, anonymous tips are on the low-end of reliability. State v. 
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235. State v. Sadler, supra State v. Dabble, supra. 
Hiding behind a cloak of anonymity precludes the magistrate from assigning 
any reliability. State v. Deluna, 2001 Ut App 401, 40 P.3d 1136. 
The affiant fails to advise that he knows the informants or their 
identification. He fails to establish how these communications were made. 
The placement of such identifying markers within the affidavit are so simply 
made that it mandates the question as to why not? 
The magistrate obligation is to distinguish between rumor and fact. 
The magistrate must find that the information set forth is reliable. With the 
affidavit failing to provide such critical information, the magistrate is 
incapable of judging the credibility of the tips. In their absence, the 
magistrate is unable to make a finding of reliability. 
Here, nothing is offered. 
Under the Mulcahy test, the affidavit may yet be sufficient if 
sufficient or detailed basis is set out the informant's tips that then may be 
reliable. In Illinois v. Gates, the United States Supreme Court determined 
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that information supplied by an unidentified informant could not alone 
create probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant. 
However, after examining the totality of the circumstances, the 
Illinois v. Gates Court further determined that the informant had provided "a 
range of details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions 
existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties not easily 
predicted." Id. at 245, 103 S.Ct. at 2335-36. In addition, "the facts obtained 
through the [officer's] independent investigation . . . at least suggested that 
the Gates were involved in drug trafficking." Id. At 243, 103 S.Ct. at 2335. 
Accordingly, based upon the quality and quantity of detail the informant 
provided, which the police independently corroborated, the court 
determined that the magistrate had "'a substantial basis for . . . [concluding]1 
that probable cause to search the Gatesesf home and car existed." Id. at 246, 
103 S.Ct. at 2336. This is also the analysis set out in Sadler, Dable, 
Mulcahy, and Valenzauela. 
DETAILED INFORMATION/BASIS OF KNOWLEDGE 
23 
Here, we are offered only conclusions from the anonymous 
informants—seven people have been seen at the residence; Poulson is 
selling methamphetamine for Sorenson; and Poulson was seen picking up 
drugs at Sorenson's. 
We do not know if they observed this themselves or if they are 
relying on hearsay or community rumor. 
In State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1989), the Court 
struck down a search warrant based on a Sheriffs conclusions. There the 
officer-affiant stated in the affidavit that a reliable confidential had told him 
that a supply of illegal substances was coming in. The Sheriff had used this 
informant before and had found him reliable. That was more than offered 
here. Here, we do not even have the officer asserting reliability. 
There is no verification of detail. No knowledge or basis is given 
as to how the informant came about such information. We have, as in 
Droneburg, are offered only conclusions. 
In Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 309, 79 S.Ct. 329, 331 
(1959), a reliable confidential informant, who had been working for the 
DEA for at least the previous six months, informed a federal narcotics agent 
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that the defendant, a suspected drug dealer, would be arriving by rail in 
Denver, Colorado, carrying heroin. The informants report contained the 
defendant's name, a detailed description of the defendant, a description of 
the clothes the defendant would be wearing on the date of his arrival, and 
the defendant's travel plans, including the date and time of the defendant's 
arrival. 
In response, the agent went to the railroad station and saw the 
defendant who matched the "exact physical attributes" and was "wearing the 
precise clothing" described by the informant. Therefore, the agent arrested 
the defendant and searched him incident to the arrest, discovering a small 
amount of heroin. The Court found that the not-so-easily obtained 
information with the officer's corroboration of that description, the tip was 
sufficiently reliable to justify the detention. 
In the present setting, no details are offered, only mere conclusions. 
Without more, no reliability can be assigned to these tips. 
The third and final factor to be considered is the officer's 
corroboration of the tip provided. 
OFFICER CORROBORATION 
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This final factor needed to substantiate the warrant's issuance is that 
the information gathered via the informant could be and was corroborated. 
There is no officer corroboration. The only corroboration suggest 
that the third unnamed source is corroborated by a second unnamed and 
admittedly criminal informant. 
The police did nothing to corroborate the data. 
CRIMINAL ACTS V. INNOCENT CONDUCT 
a. Persons visiting Poulson's Home 
In State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952 (Ct. App. 1993), the Court found 
that the fact that Potter was under investigation was of no help in the 
formulation of probable cause; i.e. it did not indicate that controlled 
substances would currently be found in his trailer. The Potter Court 
cited State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, holding that information that 
defendant had been a target of investigations by local drug agencies 
during the past several years does not indicate that controlled substances 
will currently be found at his residence. 
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Secondly, the Potter Court held that the presence of a convicted 
drug user does not establish that controlled substances would presently 
be found in the Potter trailer. The Potter Court held that an individual's 
criminal record does not establish that he is currently dealing in 
controlled substances. 
Here, the first informant told us that seven (7) people have been 
at Poulson's house that had been arrested or convicted of drug offenses. 
This inferred that a person with a criminal history would visit her home 
once every seven (7) plus days. If this is found significant, then the 
parent whose son or daughter associates with seven (7) friends have a 
criminal history becomes subject to search. The relevance of a past 
criminal history is only a history of past misdeeds and not a predictor of 
future events. 
In State v. Brooks. 849 P.2d 640 (Utah App. 1993), the Court 
found properly that information that Brooks was under investigation by 
the drug task force had no value that controlled substances would be 
currently found at his residence. As further noted in State v. Potter, the 
Brooks court found: 
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Secondly, Brooks's criminal record also does nothing to establish 
that he is currently dealing in controlled substances, particularly 
since his most recent arrest was in 1988, at least two years prior to 
the events in the case at bar. 
Here, the dates of any arrests or convictions are not 
dated. As noted in Brooks, an arrest of two years prior has no 
relevance. 
UNDATED INFORMATION 
No dates are given relating to the observations and conclusions 
excepting the appearance of Gary Sorenson at Paula Poulson's home. 
Generally, undated observation of narcotics being present have 
been held to be stale and unhelpful in determining reliability. Sitke v. 
State. 397 So. 2d 178, 182 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980). Anderson v. State. 
331 A.2d 78, 106 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975), AfFd 427 U.S. 463 (1976). 
The danger as noted by the First Circuit Court of Appeal in 
Rosencranz v. U.S. 356 F.2d 310, 317 (1st Cir. 1966) is that ancient 
information may be paraded before the Court masked as a bland present 
tense. In State v. Dable, 81 P.3d 8 783 (2003 Utah Ct. App.), the Court 
noted the importance of providing dated information: 
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Utah Informant told Utah Deputies that he had 
purchased methamphetamine from Dable's residence on 
two occasions, without giving any information about the 
recency of the purchases. Without any mention of how 
recently Utah Informant purchased drugs from Dable's 
residence, there is no way to determine whether the 
information is stale. "The question that arises with 
staleness is whether ^so much time has elapsed that 
there is no longer probable cause to believe that the 
evidence is still at the targeted locale." 
Here, the affidavit is absent of any relevant time periods—" there is 
no way to determine whether the information is stale" State v. Dabble. 
This is especially true with easily disposable contraband— probable 
cause may diminish quickly. In State v. Lunsford, 507 N.W. 2d 239, 243 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993) the Court disallowed a 7-11 day delay after 
observation of marijuana. In Ashley v. State, 241 N.E.2d 264, 269 (Ind. 
1968), the Court held that 8 days was too long. See also State v. 
Josephson, 852 P.2d 1387,1391-2 (Idaho 1993). A delay of 3 days was stale 
unless evidence existed of continuing drug possession of sales. State v. 
Wise, 434 So. 2d 1308, 1311-12 (La. Ct. App. 1983). 
SIGNIFICANCE OF PEOPLE VISITING THE HOME? 
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Courts have been reluctant to justify the detention of a person 
who drove to a home, stayed a short time and left. In Lemon v. State. 
580 So.2d 292 (Fla. App. 1991), a police officer, while patrolling a high 
crime area, observed a car stop in front of an apartment complex known 
for drug activity. He watched the driver enter the complex, return after a 
brief interlude, and then leave in the car. The court held that these 
circumstances were insufficient to justify stopping the driver, as "they 
amount to no more than a bare suspicion of illegal activity." Id. at 293. 
Those circumstances likewise did not justify a pat-down search for 
weapons after the defendant was stopped. Id. 
In State v. Sykes. 840 P.2d 825 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) a similar 
case factually was presented with a similar ruling. The Court found that 
the officer lacked reasonable cause to stop a motorist when they had the 
following: 
(1) Neighbors had complained about individuals entering and 
leaving the house at all hours. 
(2) A deputy previously had purchased cocaine in the general 
area. Not present here. 
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(3) There was unspecified information from a confidential 
informant. Applicable here. 
(4) There was an ongoing investigation of the house. 
(5) Defendant drove up to the house, entered it and left shortly 
thereafter. 
A defendant's mere presence in an area suspected to 
harbor drug activity does not give rise to reasonable suspicion. 
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 
L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). 
NO KNOCK ENTRY 
Under the decision of State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 1994), 
the Utah Courts have recognized that a violation of the 'no knock' 
provisions may require a suppression of evidence. 
The only basis to issue the 'no knock' would be John Ramey's prior 
conviction of 'assault'. No data is given as to the likelihood of Mr. Ramey 
being present. We do not know when he was observed at the home— 
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whether it was the day preceding, one month or even one year previous. We 
do not know the purpose of his visit. We have no indications that he would 
be at the home when the warrant was served. 
The mere association of a person who may have a criminal record of 
assault should not invite the police to enter a home with guns drawn and 
without notice. State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640 (Utah App. 1993), 
CONCLUSION 
This is poor police work. The police seek a warrant to search a 
home based on association with other persons. A confidential informant 
concludes that Poulson is selling drugs. However, this informant, as the 
other two, lack any indicia of reliability particularly: 
1. No detailed observations. 
2. No corroboration by the police. 
Here, the affiant does no more than try to substantiate one informant 
by referring to a second unnamed informant. We do not even have the 
officer attesting to any informant's reliability. 
Our homes should not be subject to search by our mere association 
with certain individuals. Further, these reports are undated. 
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This motion to suppress should have been granted. If not, we 
reward officers who will continue in their sloppy, if not lazy, methods. 
DATED this 9m day of November, 2004 
AttorneyTor appellant f 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of appellant's brief to: 
Attorney General for the State of Utah (four copies) 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Utah Court of Appeals (eighth copies) 
450 South State 
#500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
Postage prepaid this l| th day of November, 2001. 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Search Warrant 
2. Affidavit in Support of the Search Warrant 
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IN THE 6TK DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SANPETE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: S3. 
COUNTY OF SANPETE ) 
SEARCH WARRANT 
To any Peace Officer in the State of, Utah: 
Proof of affidavit under oath having been made this day 
before me by DET. CLARK THOMAS, I am satisfied that there is 
probable cause to believe that 
(X) on the premises known as 48 0 NORTfrt'o 0 WEST, MT. 
PLEASANT, UTAH. THE RESIDENCE HAS WOOD SIDING SOME WHITE SOME 
BROWN- CHARCOAL COLORED ROOF, MAIN ENTRANCE FACES SOUTH ALSO 
A WEST FACING DOOR ON THE NORTH ENJ OF THE HOUSE. 
(X) in the vehicle (s) described as ANY VEHICLES AT THE 
RESIDENCE AT THE TIME OF THE EXECUTION OF THIS 
WARRANT. 
In the City of MT. PLEASANT, County of SANPETE, State of Utah, 
there is now certain property or evidence described as: 
(items in search of) 
METHAMPHETAMINE, PARAPHERNALIA TO CONSUME METHAMPHETAMINE 
OWE SHEETS, PAPERS OR DOCUMENTS TO SHOW LEGAL OWNERSHIP OP THE 
HOME, SCALES AND PACKAGING MATERIAL. COMPUTER AND ANY DIGITAL 
STORAGE MEDIA THAT WOULD INCLUDE B^ JT NOT LIMITED TO 3XS FLOPPY 
DISKS, ZIP DISKS AND CD ROMS AND AJSTY DEVICE THAT CAN BE CONNECTED 
TO THE INTERNET. 
which property or evidence: 
(X) is unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed. 
(X) has been used as a means to commit a public offense 
(X) is being possessed with -he purpose to use it as a 
means of committing or concealing a public offense. 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
{ ) is evidence of illegal conduct in possession of a 
person or entity not a party to the illegal conduct and 
good cause being shown that the seizure cannot be 
obtained by subpoena without the evidence being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered. (Conditions 
for service of this Warrant are included or attached 
hereto) 
/ou are therefore commanded: 
(X) in the daytime 
{ ) at any time day or night (good cause having been shown.) 
(X) (no knock) to execute without notice of authority or 
purpose, (proof under oa4:h being shown than the ob^ecc 
of this search may be quickly destroyed or disposed of 
or that harm may result to any person if notice were 
given) THAT SOME OF TKli SUBJECTS GOING TO THIS 
RESIDENCE HAVE A HISTORY OF- VIOLENCE RANGING FROM 
ASSAULT TO WEAPONS AND CONCEALED WEAPONS VIOLATIONS 
IT IS ALSO THE EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING OF YOUR AFFIANT 
THAT IP OFFICERS ARE ALLOWED THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE 
NOT ONLY IS THE EVIDENCE BETTER PRESERVED, BUT THE ' 
SAFETY OF THE OFFICERS, SUSPECTS, AND INNOCENT BY-
STANDERS ARE BETTER PROJECTED BECAUSE IT REMOVES THE 
POSSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE DESTRUCTION, HOSTAGE 
SITUATIONS, AND BARRICADED STAND-OFFS. 
to make a search of the above-named or described oer^nn f<=i 
premises and vehicle (s) for the hereinabove dtsc^btTlrL^ 
or evidence and if
 y o u find the same or any part thereof r°?*X t Y 
bring it forthwith before me at the 6TH D I S T R T S r™,Z? - t 0 
SANPETE, State of Utah, or retain Such prooertSSn ' O U n t y ° f 
subject to the order of this Court ProPerty in your custody, 
Given under my hand anddatec: this 14TH day of AUGUST, 2002. 
^ o ~ < l V 
JudPf', Justice off the Peace" 
__JZil£d_<l^ Court 
IN THE 6TH DISTRICT COLUT, COUNTY OF SANPETE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SANPETE ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR S.2ARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL LiMAN 
The undersigned, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That affiant has reason to believe that 
(X ) on- the premises known as 480 NORTH 10 0 WEST, MT. 
PLEASANT, UTAH THE RESIDENCE HAS WOOD SIDING SOME WHITE SOME 
BROWN, CHARCOAL COLORED ROOF, MAIN ENTRANCE FACES SOUTH. ALSO A 
WEST FACING DOOR ON THE NORTH END OF THE HOUSE. 
(X) in the vehicle (s) described as ANY VEHICLES AT THE 
RESIDENCE AT THE TIME OF THE EXECUTION OF THIS WARRANT. In the 
City of MT. PLEASANT, County of SANPETE, State of Utah, there is 
now certain property or evidence described as: 
METHAMPHETAMINE, PARAPHERNALIA TO CONSUME METHAMPHETAMINE 
OWE SHEETS, PAPERS OR DOCUMENTS TO SHOW LEGAL OWNERSHIP OF THE' 
HOME, SCALES AND PACKAGING MATERIAL,. COMPUTER AND ANY DIGITAL 
STORAGE MEDIA THAT WOULD INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO 3X5 FLOPPY 
DISKS, ZIP DISKS AND CD ROMS AND PNY DEVICE THAT CAN BE CONNECTED 
TO THE INTERNET. 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) is unlawfully acquired cr unlawfully possessed. 
(X) has been used as a means of committing a public 
offense. 
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a 
means of committing or concealing a public offense. 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
( ) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to 
the illegal conduct. 
I believe the property and evidence described above is evidence 
of the crime of DISTRIBUTION OF METHAMPHETAMINE. 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search 
Warrant, are: 
SEE ATTACHMENT A AND 8 
a c -' - v-. *-
arridnc considers the information received from the 
confidential informant reliable because (if any information is 
obtained from an unnamed informant): 
THE INFORMANT GAVE INFORMATION L^l THE PAST THAT HAS BEEN 
PROVEN ACCURATE BY DET. THOMAS. 
Your affiant has verified the above information to be correct and 
accurate because ol the following Independent investigation: 
DET. THOMAS SPOKE WITH A CITIZEN INFORMANT THAT CONFIRMED 
THE INFORMATION GIVE BY' THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT, 
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for 
the seizure of said items 
(X) in the daytime. 
( ) at any time day or night because there is reason to 
believe it is necessary to seize the property prior to 
it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or 
for other good reason. 
(X) ( no knock) to execute without notice of authority or 
purpose, (proof under oath being shown that the object 
of this search may be quickly destroyed or disposed of 
or that harm may result to any person if notice were 
given) . THAT SOME OF THE SUBJECTS GOING TO THIS 
RESIDENCE HAVE A HISTORY OF VIOLENCE RANGING FROM 
ASSAULT TO WEAPONS AND CONCEALED WEAPONS VIOLATIONS. IT 
IS ALSO THE EXPERIENCE AMD TRAINING OF YOUR AFFIANT' 
THAT IF OFFICERS ARE ALLOWED THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE, 
NOT ONLY IS THE EVIDENCE BETTER PRESERVED, BUT THE 
SAFETY OF THE OFFICERS, SUSPECTS, AND INNOCENT BY 
STANDERS ARE BETTER PROTECTED BECAUSE IT REMOVES THE 
POSSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE DESTRUCTION, HOSTAGE 
SITUATIONS, AND BARRICAQJJD STAND-OFFS. 
C&kk^kim^ ^STFFIANT 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 14TH day of 
AUGUST, 2 002. 
o 
JUDGE 
Court 
County o£ SANPETE, S t a t e o f 'Utah 
ATTACHMENT A AFFIDAVIT 
GROUNDS FOR ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT 
S I N C E ^ J U N R 1 9 T R ^ 2 0 Q 2 / I HA^/E RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM A 
crrrzEN INF&RMANT R?OARDTNG A LOT OF TRAFFIC THAT IS SHORT TERM, 
ARRIVING AND DEPARTING WITHIN TWO TO THREE MINUTES AT THE RESIDENCE 
OF PAULA POULSON AND TERRY HANKS. THIS RESIDENCE IS LOCATED AT 480 
NORTH 10 0 WEST MT. PLEASANT, UTAH- DETECTIVES OF THE CENTRAL UTAH 
NARCOTICS TASK FORCE HAVE BEEN WORKING THIS CASE SINCE JUNE 19TH 
2002. 
THE CITIZEN INFORMANT GAVE ME INFORMATION ABOUT VEHICLE 
LICENSES AND PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE BEEN GOING 
TO THIS RESIDENCE. VEHICLE LICENSES HAVE BEEN RUN ON THE STATE 
WIDE COMPUTER AND THE OWNERS OF THE VEHICLES IDENTIFIED. ALSO 
CRIMINAL HISTORIES OF THOSE SUBJECTS HAVE BEEN OBTAINED FROM THE 
STATE COMPUTER. 
THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS HAVE SHOWED UP AT THIS LOCATION ON 
MORE THAN ONE OCCASION, 
1. GARY L. SORENSON D.O.B. 3-01-63 HAS BEEN ARRESTED FOR: 
A. DISTRIBUTION OF METHAMPHETAMINE CONVICTED 
B. POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE CONVICTED 
C. CARRYING A CONCEALED WEAPON 
D. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
2. fJOEN C- RAMEY, D^Q-3-? 1C-16-58 HAS BEEN ARRESTED FOR-
A. AGGRAVATED BURGLARY 
B. NARCOTIC EQUIPMENT POSSESSION 
C. AMPHETAMINE POSSESSION 
<fD"~ASSAULT ""-"CONVICTED^ 
3. KENNETH HINTON D.O.B. 12-28-74 HAS BEEN ARRESTED FOR-
A. POSSESSION OF HALLUCINOGEN 
B. POSSESSION OF NARCOTIC EQUIPMENT 
C. POSSESSION OR USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE CONVICTED 
D. POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA CONVICTED 
4. DAVID W. TIMMS D.O.B. 11-14-78 HAS BEEN ARRESTED FOR • 
A. DISTRIBUTION/ MANUFACTURE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
B. ESCAPE FROM OFFICIAL CUSTODY CONVICTED 
C. POSS/USE OF CONTROLLEE SUBSTANCES CONVICTED 
D. POSSESSION OF PARAPHERNALIA 
5. JESSICA L. SHELLEY D.O.B. 11-05-78 HAS BEEN ARRESTED FOR -
A. POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE W/INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE* 
B. POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA 
C. POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES CONVICTED 
FOR: 
D. POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA CONVICTED 
E. JESSICA IS CURRENTLY AWAITING TRIAL FOR 2 COUNTS 
DISTRIBUTION OF METHAMPHETAMINE . 
\. ALLEN P. STEVENS D.O.B. 6-30-65 HAS BEEN ARRESTED FOR: 
A. POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA CONVICTED 
B. DOMESTIC ASSAULT 
CHESLEY L. CHRISTENSEN D.O.B. 7-13-65 HAS BEEN ARRESTED 
A. POSSESSION AND USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES CONVICTED 
B. POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE 
C. POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA 
D. POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE 
E. CHESLEY WAS ON FELONY PROBATION UNTIL 9-17-01 
TERRY A, HANKS D.O.B. 10-28-46 ( A CO-RABITANT OF THIS 
RESIDENCE WITH PAULA POULSON) HAS BEEN ARRESTED FOR: 
A. POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA CONVICTED 
IN ADDITION TO THE NAMES LISTED ABOVE MORE THAN 14 OTHER 
SEPARATE VEHICLES HAVE ARRIVED AT THIS RESIDENCE AT DIFFERENT TIMES 
AND DATES, SOME OF THEM ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION, 
IT IS THE EXPERIENCE AND TRAILING OF DETECTIVES OF THE TASK 
FORCE THAT THIS ACTIVITY IS CONSISTENT WITH THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES. 
ON 8-12-02 DETECTIVES JENKINS AND WHATCOTT MET WITH A 
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT. THE INFORMANT STATED THAT PAULA POULSON 
HAS BEEN AND IS STILL SELLING A LOT OF METHAMPHETAMINE FOR GARY 
SORENSON. 
YOUR AFFIANT FEELS THIS INFORMATION IS 'RELIABLE FROM THIS 
INFORMANT BECAUSE THIS COINCIDES WITH INFORMATION THAT DETECTIVES 
THOMAS AND EKKER RECEIVED FROM A CITIZEN INFORMANT. THE CITIZEN 
INFORMANT TOLD DETECTIVES THAT THE INFORMANT HAS SEEN PAULA POULSON 
AT GARY SORENSON'S RESIDENCE MORE THAN ONCE PICKING UP 
METHAMPHETAMINE. THE CITIZEN INFORMANT HAS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT 
PAULA IS SELLING THE METHAMPHETAMINE FOR GARY SORENSON. 
ON 8-8-02 DETECTIVES FROM THE CENTRAL UTAH NARCTICS TASK FORCE 
AMONG OTHER OFFICERS EXECUTED A SEARCH WARRANT AT GARY SORENSON'S 
RESIDENCE. FOUND AT THIS RESIDENCE WERE METHAMPHETAMINE, SCALES, 
PACKAGING MATERIAL, OWE SHEETS PARAPHERNALIA I.E. GLASS PIPES FOR 
METH AND MARIJUANA. GARY SORENSON WAS NOT AT THE RESIDENCE AT THAT 
TIME. GARY SORENSON HAS BEEN SEEN AT PAULA POULSON'S RESIDENCE ON 
8-9-02 AND 8-10-02. THERE IS CURRENTLY AN ARREST WARRANT OUT FOR 
GARY SORENSON. 
YOUR AFFIANT THEREFORE PRAYS A SEARCH WARRANT 3E GRANTED FOR 
THE RESIDENCE OF PAULA FOULSON LOCATED AT 48 0 NORTH i0 0 WEST MT. 
PLEASANT, UTAH. TO INCLUDE THE HOUSE, ANY OUTBUILDING, PERSONS AND 
VEHICLES THAT ARE AT THE RESIDENCE AT THE TIME THE SEARCH WARRANT 
IS EXECUTED. WE ALSO ASK TO SEARCH FOR EVIDENCE IN ANY COMPUTER AT 
THIS RESIDENCE. THE COMPUTER AND ANY DIGITAL STORAGE MEDIA THAT 
WOULD INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO 3X5 FLOPPY DISKS, ZIP DISKS AND CD 
ROMS AND ANY DEVICE THAT CAN BE CONNECTED TO THE INTERNET. THE 
PURPOSE FOR THIS IS THAT COMPUTERS ARE OFTEN FOUND IN HOMES, THAT 
INFORMATION SUCH AS OWE SHEETS, NAMES AND ADDRESSES CAN BE STORED 
HERE. ALSO THERE CAN BE PHOTOS THAT CAN IDENTIFY SUBJECTS. WE 
ALSO ASK TO SEARCH E-MAILS FOR CORRESPONDENCE PERTAINING TO 
PURCHASE AND SALES OF METHAMPHETAMIINE, BILLS OWING AND BILLS PAID. 
